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Happy Spring, everyone. I have the honor—and the challenge—of taking over as 
managing editor of CTX in the place of Julia McClenon, who did yeoman’s work 
producing the first three issues of this groundbreaking new journal. A word about 
myself: I have been a professional editor and publication manager for more than 
12 years, specializing in the fields of nonproliferation, international relations, na-
tional security, and civil-military relations. Following a year with NATO Allied Com-
mand Transformation in Virginia, I was excited to be offered this opportunity to join 
the CTFP group and take over management of CTX. The journal has seen another 
important change in personnel since the last issue:  We are sorry to say goodbye to 
layout and design editor Amelia Simunek, who did so much to help get the journal 
on its feet. Ryan Stuart now brings her skills to this role, and we are happy to wel-
come her to the CTX team.
This is a good moment to talk about my vision for the future of CTX, which is an un-
usual kind of publication in the military realm, written for practitioners, by practi-
tioners. Most of its articles are in the first person, recounted by the people who’ve 
“been there, done that,” offering CT operators the opportunity to learn from the 
experiences of their peer community around the world. It is especially important to 
me to preserve the unique voices of our contributors. I will work closely with new 
writers, and those for whom English is not a first, or even second, language, in a 
collaborative process to ensure your stories, rendered in clear, accessible English, 
remain your own. 
From the beginning, CTX has encouraged submissions that challenge conventional 
wisdom or offer new perspectives and insights. The present issue offers some fine 
examples of what I have in mind. In the first two articles, LT Malaka Chandradasa 
of the Sri Lankan Navy describes the ways in which Sri Lanka’s naval and air forces 
were able to abandon “legacy” thinking, adapt to the tactics of a tenacious, well-
funded, well-armed insurgency, and gradually turn the tide of conflict from stale-
mate to victory. 
The best ideas and intentions, however, may not pay off if operators don’t have access 
to the information they need for planning. LTC Arjan Hilaj of the Albanian Army 
describes a well-intended mission to “win the hearts and minds” of Afghan villagers 
in a hostile area, that went awry simply from inadequate understanding of the local 
culture and conditions. His insights may help others with similar assignments.
From Central Asia we go to South Sudan, a new African country still struggling 
to establish itself since independence in 2011. Ceaseless border fighting with 
Sudan has taxed the young government, a situation that may be made worse by 
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2Khartoum’s adoption of targeted assassinations. Author 
Thon Agany Ayiei reflects on the implications of Khar-
toum’s use of sophisticated intelligence and airstrike 
capabilities to kill a prominent Darfuri leader.
The last main article takes us back north to Iran, with 
a discussion of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps’ 
role in Iran’s politics and economy. COL Sean Corrigan 
describes how the IRGC’s position outside the structure 
of the regular armed forces, its privileged access to Iran’s 
political power structure, and its extensive infiltration of 
both the licit and illicit economies of Iran, make it a prima-
ry target of internal dissent. This dissatisfaction, Corrigan 
suggests, may leave the IRGC vulnerable to disruption by 
the United States and its allies.
In this issue, we are introducing a new occasional column 
called State of the Art. Contributor Rachel Davis examines 
the similarities between high-profile terrorism, epitomized 
by the 9/11 attacks, and the work of high-profile concep-
tual artists such as Damien Hirst. My intent as editor is 
that contributions like this will inspire and provoke us to 
think differently than we normally do about terrorism, 
those who practice it, and those who work to stop it. If 
you have an idea you think is too far outside the box for 
publication, try me.
We have two book reviews for you this time: Pakistan on 
the Brink, Ahmed Rashid’s new look at the Central Asian 
dilemma; and Rusty Bradley’s Lions of Kandahar, a first-
hand account of Operation Medusa in Kandahar, Afghani-
stan. Kalev I. Sepp reminds us, through his review of five 
films on the Irish Civil War, that there are lessons we can 
learn from that 100-year old conflict for dealing with cur-
rent civil wars and insurgencies around the globe.
Finally, after you’ve read George Lober’s column on 
military ethics, titled “Moral Courage—Take Two,” give 
yourself time to think over it. He tackles a topic that, he 
suggests, may have an easy solution, but one that few 
seem willing to embrace.
Finally, as always, CTX remains a work in progress. I look 
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George Lober guides U.S. and international military 
students through the tricky terrain of ethics and critical 
thinking at the Naval Postgraduate School.
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Lions of Kandahar: The Story of a Fight Against all Odds
LTC Jan Novak









4Vol. 2, No. 2 May 2012 | CTXLearning from Our Enemies:Sri Lankan Naval Special Warfare against the Sea Tigers
LT Malaka Chandradasa, Sri Lankan Navy
Enemies are our best teachers. 
—quote posted in house of Sea Tigers commander Colonel Soosai
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was one of the most effective—and brutal—insurgent movements of recent 
times. With the strategic goal of seceding from Sri Lanka and establishing a separate state to be known as “Tamil Eelam,” 
the LTTE waged a bloody war for 30 years, until the Sri Lankan military finally defeated it in May 2009.
The LTTE notably was one of the very few insurgent groups to de-
velop operational sea capabilities.1 Its ability to dominate the sea 
routes to south India, which provided the closest external sanctuary 
for LTTE fighters, and which enabled it to reinforce its operations by 
sea, proved crucial to the group’s longevity. The Sea Tigers, LTTE’s 
naval wing, was formed in the early 1980s and was highly effective, 
especially in its use of the Black Sea Tiger element, a waterborne 
unit of the Black Tigers, the LTTE’s elite, highly trained suicide force. 
In the contest at sea between the Sea Tigers and the Sri Lankan Navy, both sides learned lessons from each other and 
adapted accordingly. This article will describe this interactive learning process and how the Sri Lankan Navy ultimately 
defeated the Sea Tigers. 
LTTE:	Adaptations	at	Sea
The supreme leader of the LTTE, Velupillai 
Prabhakaran, formed the Sea Tigers in the 
early 1980s under the leadership of Thillai-
yampalam Sivanesan, a tactical and strategic 
mastermind who went by the alias “Colonel 
Soosai.” The Sea Tigers started off using small 
boats and ferries to transport supplies and 
troops across the waters separating northern 
Sri Lanka from Tamil Nadu province in the 
south of India, where the LTTE was widely 
supported.2 The LTTE also owned its own in-
ternational shipping network, which provided 
the equipment and logistics needed by the 
group’s fighters, known as the Tamil Tigers. Various LTTE Attack Craft
In the contest at sea between the Sea 
Tigers and the Sri Lankan Navy, both 
sides learned lessons from each other 
and adapted accordingly.
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Initial attempts by the Sri Lankan Navy (SLN) to hinder these 
operations using its fleet of offshore patrol vessels were 
somewhat successful, but those efforts led the Sea Tigers to 
adapt. The insurgents locally manufactured their own fiber-
glass fast-attack craft, equipping the larger boats with four 
250-horsepower, outboard engines and the smaller boats with 
two engines. These faster craft, with their more powerful en-
gines, allowed the Sea Tigers to outrun the slower SLN patrols.  
The Sea Tigers’ boats were mainly the 45-kilotonne “Thrikka,” 
with four crew members and a machine gun; the 10-kilotonne 
“Sudai,” carrying a single machine gun; the 45-kilotonne 
“Muraj” or “Waverider,” with a crew of 10; and the “Idayan,” 
a 45-kilotonne suicide craft. The Muraj was used mainly as a 
command vessel and is comparable in most ways to the SLN’s 
own inshore patrol craft.
The Sea Tigers lacked their own harbors or secure launching 
sites, so they adapted by engineering a method of launching 
their boats using tractors and trailers. This enabled them to 
launch from any beachfront location they could access. The 
LTTE would hide the craft inshore, sometimes more than 10 
kilometers away from the beach, and would launch only when 
necessary. This gave the LTTE mobility, flexibility, and the ele-
ment of surprise.
The Sea Tigers’ most successful innovation was their use of the 
“wolf pack” tactic.3 Once the Sea Tigers identified a target, five 
or more of their small boats would approach the target craft, 
engage it from all directions, and prevent it from fleeing the 
area. While these small boats engaged the target, a suicide 
craft would move toward the target boat using the cover of 
the larger command vessels. These suicide boats were usu-
ally small, fiberglass boats manned by a single Black Tiger. The 
hull of the boat was packed with high explosives and rigged 
to a pressure trigger located at the craft’s pointed prow, set to 




The Sri Lankan Navy began as a ceremonial force left behind by 
the British Empire, and was predominantly used as a logistics 
support element of the Sri Lankan Army. In the 1990s, the SLN 
had only large ships, mostly inherited from the Royal Navy or 
gifted by friendly nations. While these were well-suited for 
blue-water patrolling operations to safeguard against unau-
thorized fishing or smuggling, they definitely were no match for 
the heavily armed, small-boat, coastal operations conducted by 
Suicide Craft with Plastic Explosive 
Connected to Pressure Fuses
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the Sea Tigers. In other words, the LTTE boats were the ideal asymmetrical match for the SLN’s large, less maneuverable, 
conventional fleet. 
By the early 1990s, the Navy understood that it needed to adapt and become a more aggressive fighting force to domi-
nate the lagoon/mangrove swamps of the Jaffna peninsula and eastern areas, and counter the mounting threat posed 
by the Sea Tigers. Consequently, in 1993 the Sri Lankan Armed Forces (SLAF) formed the Special Boat Squadron (SBS), 
modeled after the British Navy’s elite Special Boat Service and 
the U.S. Navy’s elite SEALs, under the command of then-LCDR 
Ravindra Chandrasiri Wijegunarathne (presently RADM and the 
Northern Area Naval Commander). The SBS carried out its first 
operation in November 1993, when it played an integral part 
in the recapture of a Navy camp in Pooneryn, which had been 
attacked and overrun by terrorists. 
At sea, the Sri Lankan Navy’s first line of response were Israeli-
built Dvora craft.4 In an interview, Admiral Wasantha 
Karrannagoda, former commander of the Sri Lankan Navy, said 
that in its search for the right platform to counter the Sea Tigers, 
the SLN found that “the Israeli Navy was facing a similar threat 
and were using Dvora fast-attack craft as a response.” The  
Dvoras provided an effective response to the LTTE’s logistics 
boats, which were used by the insurgents mainly to transport 
supplies from their ships operating in international waters, and 
to smuggle supplies and personnel in and out of south India. The 
Navy’s 4th Fast Attack Flotilla, also known as the Dvora Squad-
ron, was at the forefront of the fight against the Sea Tigers, 
protecting both naval and civilian transport vessels. 
The Dvoras, however, proved vulnerable to the LTTE’s wolf pack attacks because of the Dvoras’ limited close-contact 
capabilities and maneuverability. The Sea Tigers managed to engage these boats successfully, sinking more than 20 of 
them.5 The Sea Tigers also continued their successful attacks against larger vessels, sinking transport ships and gunboats 
at will, and attacking civilian ships bearing supplies to the north and east.
Sri	Lankan	Navy	Makes	Successful	Adaptations
The realization that the heavier Dvoras were no 
match for the small, fast-moving, and lightly-crewed 
boats of the Sea Tigers in shallower seas came at a 
high cost. The SBS experimented with smaller, lighter 
craft, including rubber combat-reconnaissance craft, 
but most were too small and slow, and proved highly 
ineffective against the Sea Tigers. At this point, the Sri 
Lankan Navy appeared to be at a dead end, unable 
to match or counter the naval capabilities of the Sea 
Tigers.
This changed in 2006, when a Sri Lankan Navy SBS 
operation, led by LCDR Mudiyanselage Bandula Dis-
sanayake (who was injured during a LTTE attack in 
2009 and retired from the Navy in 2012), discovered 
Super Dvora MK II
SLN Arrow Boat used by the SBS
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where the LTTE was manufacturing the 16-foot boats its 
forces used for their wolf-pack attacks. SBS personnel found 
a boat buried in the ground at the site, which was later re-
covered and brought to the Navy dockyard at Trincomalee. 
Navy engineers reverse-engineered a version of this boat, 
which became the SLN’s first 16-foot Arrow Boat. The small, 
highly maneuverable boat was fitted with a 12.7 mm main 
gun and an automatic grenade launcher on the stern. Two 
115-horsepower outboard engines propelled it to speeds in 
excess of 25 knots. 
With the guidance and encouragement of then-SLN  
Commander VADM Wasantha Karannagoda, Navy engi-
neers continued to experiment with different configurations 
of this base model. The experiments yielded two more ver-
sions of the Arrow Boat, the 18-footer and the highly suc-
cessful 23-foot model, which went into mass production. The 23-footer was manned by four people: a coxswain, main 
gunner, stern gunner, and side gunner. It could be fitted with a 12.7 mm, 23 mm, or 30 mm main gun (some even were 
equipped with twin cannon versions); a 12.7 mm or automatic grenade launcher stern gun; and two 7.62 mm Chinese 
multi-purpose machine guns at the sides. Powered by two 250-horsepower engines, the boat boasted speeds of up  
to 35 knots. 
During the period from 2007 to 2009, 200 of the 23-foot Arrow Boats were produced at the Navy’s dockyard in Welisara.6 
These boats, though small, are capable of operating in conditions up to Sea State-4.7 The boats’ significantly shallower 
draft allows mobility in extremely shallow waters, while the comparatively narrow beam presents a smaller target at sea, 
and makes targeting from land almost impossible.
Making	Gains	against	Insurgents
The combination of high firepower with a maneuverable, high-speed platform gave these Arrow Boats the ability to en-
gage the smaller Sea Tiger boats on their own terms, fighting one-on-one at close quarters.8 The most credible testament 
to the success of these small Arrow Boats came from the Sea Tigers themselves, who described the difficulties of coun-
tering the SLN’s new fleet of small boats.
While the Arrow Boats provided the much-needed platform to counter 
the Sea Tigers, the Navy’s training, operational, and tactical doctrines 
also underwent drastic changes. The Navy introduced the operational 
concept of four layers of “defense barriers.” This concept made use of 
the Navy’s flagship and larger offshore vessels in the outermost layer, 
gun boats in the next layer landward, the Dvoras in the second layer from 
land, and the Arrow Boats as the first line of defense in coastal waters. 
This layered system offered protection and offensive capability against 
the movements of the Sea Tigers, and helped prevent the Sea Tigers from 
bringing in troops and equipment from ships in international waters, or from southern India to the Tamil areas of Sri Lanka. It 
also prevented the LTTE leadership from escaping Sri Lanka by sea during the latter stages of the conflict.
The SBS also developed a specific tactical formation for using these Arrow Boats. The formation was led by one command 
boat, either a Waverider or an inshore patrol craft, equipped with electro-optical devices and radar capabilities.9 This 
command boat served as the eyes and ears of the smaller boats when patrolling and monitoring the Sea Tigers’ move-
ments. Because the smaller boats did not have radar capability and their personnel had only limited vision, particularly 
SLN Arrow Boat used by the SBS
The combination of high firepower on 
a highly maneuverable, high-speed 
platform gave these Arrow Boats the 
ability to engage the smaller  Sea 
Tiger boats on their own terms.
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at night when the crew members had to rely on night-vision goggles, the command boats played a vital role in detecting 
and engaging the Sea Tigers.
 When encountering larger enemy craft that were operating individually, the Arrow Boats imitated the swarming tactics 
of the Sea Tigers. For smaller enemy craft, the Arrow Boats would engage in close-quarter fighting, sometimes closing 
within 20 meters of the enemy boats, in what could be compared to dogfights between fighter jets. The possibility that 
the Sea Tiger boat formations included suicide vessels made every episode of close contact a potentially deadly ordeal. 
The attack patterns of the Sea Tigers from 2006 to 2009 clearly illustrate the success of the SLN’s operations. In 2006, Sea 
Tigers engaged the Navy offensively more than 21 times. In 2007, the number of confrontations was 12. In 2008, there 
were fewer than five confrontations, and finally by 2009, the Sea Tigers were defeated. 
Notes
1 Arabinda Acharya and Nadeeka P. Withana, “Groups with Maritime Terrorist Capabilities in the Indian Ocean Region,” in Mari-
time Security in the Indian Ocean Region: Critical Issues in Debate, ed. V. R. Raghavan and W. Lawrence S. Prabhakar  (New Delhi: 
Tata McGraw–Hill, 2008), 204–7; Peter Lehr, “Asymmetric Warfare in the Indian Ocean: What Kind of Threat from What Kind of 
Actor,” in Raghavan and Prabhakar, Maritime Security, 173, 178–79; Rohan Gunaratna, “The Asymmetric Threat from Maritime 
Terrorism,” Jane’s Navy International, Oct. 1, 2001.
2 While there is a vast amount of conflicting literature regarding the involvement of India and Tamil Nadu with the LTTE, many in 
the region are sure that the Tigers enjoyed strong support among the population and politicians of Tamil Nadu.
3 The Sea Tigers also developed new tactics and operations using suicide submersibles, floating sea mines, and suicide divers. 
4 The Dvora or fast attack craft were initially purchased from Israel and later from the United States. The Colombo Dockyard also 
manufactured these craft.
5 The numbers are taken from reports in “Humanitarian Operation Factual Analysis: July 2006–May 2009,” from the Ministry of 
Defence, Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, July 2011; retrieved from http://www.defence.lk/news/20110801_Conf.pdf. 
These figures include only naval vessels destroyed by attacks. Some underwater suicide divers are known to have used submers-
ible vehicles.
6 By the end of 2009, the Navy’s dockyard in Walisara had completed 200 Arrow Boats. The Defense Secretary of Sri Lanka put 
the 100th boat under way ceremonially on September 11, 2008. Dhaneshi Yatawara, “SLN launches 100th Arrow Boat” Sunday 
Observer, Sept. 14, 2008; retrieved from http://www.sundayobserver.lk/2008/09/14/sec02.asp/.
7 Sea state is the general condition of the sea’s surface, with respect to wind, waves and swell at a certain location and moment. 
Sea State-4 is classified as moderate seas with swells of 1.25 to 2.5 meters.
8 These boats carried no armor to provide defense. The weight and other constraints associated with armor proved to be a hin-
drance in the battle space. 
9 Waverider is a larger patrol craft that was designed and manufactured by the Navy Dockyard. This was modeled after the “Indu-
mathi” craft captured from the LTTE. Inshore patrol craft are boats smaller than the Dvora, manned by about 12 people, with the 
ability to carry radar and EOD systems.
Photos
All photos courtesy of the author.
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LT Malaka Chandradasa
Airpower is strategically important in conventional warfare. The ability to bypass an enemy’s land and naval forces and 
directly target its political, economic, and industrial hubs can prove tremendously advantageous in state-on-state war-
fare. Yet, the application of strategic air power in the context of irregular conflicts is problematic for even the world’s 
most sophisticated militaries.
In most cases, insurgent forces do not possess industrial or economic 
strongholds that can be attacked with airpower. Nor are insurgents typically 
distinguishable from the civilian population, which puts civilians at risk in 
the event of an aerial assault. Nevertheless, over more than three decades, 
the Sri Lankan Air Force (SLAF) learned to utilize airpower effectively as part 
of the larger effort to defeat the insurgent forces of the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam (LTTE). 
Instead of indiscriminately bombing the areas held by insurgents and 
thereby antagonizing the population who were sympathetic to the insur-
gent cause, the Air Force, along with the other military forces of the government, developed a counterinsurgency (COIN) 
doctrine to overcome the LTTE. Specifically, the Air Force provided air superiority; logistical support; close-air support; 
precision bombing; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; search and rescue; and access to denied areas. 
All of these responsibilities fell to a service that just a few years earlier had 
been primarily a ceremonial force. The Sri Lankan Air Force was estab-
lished as the Royal Ceylon Air Force in 1951, but did not possess a single 
aircraft until 1971. In contrast, the LTTE leadership quickly understood 
the advantage of even a limited air capability. In the mid-1980s, the LTTE 
began training pilots and building improvised aircraft, a move that would 
eventually compel the SLAF to improve its own capabilities. By 2005, the 
insurgent forces had a fleet of two Micro Light Aircraft, five Light Aircraft 
(ZLIN 143), two helicopters, and two remote controlled planes.1 The LTTE 
also procured shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), which it used 
to shoot down five SLAF flights and two commercial aircraft, killing 256 
people. 
These attacks by the LTTE meant that the SLAF not only had to support land and naval forces in its COIN operations, but 
also had to fight to maintain its dominance, or even control, of Sri Lankan airspace. The consequences of the SLAF’s fail-
ure to maintain control was made abundantly clear when the LTTE successfully attacked the capital city of Colombo and 
Sri Lanka’s only international airport, destroying lives as well as many civilian aircraft, and causing heavy damage to the 
country’s economy. The SLAF was also severely handicapped in its ground support role because of the LTTE’s acquisition 
and utilization of enormous numbers of surface-to-air missiles.
The Air Force provided air superi- 
ority; logistical support; close-
air support; precision bombing; 
intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance; search and res-
cue; and access to denied areas.
These attacks [on the capital 
city] by the LTTE meant that 
the SLAF not only had to sup-
port land and naval forces in its 
COIN operations, but also had to 
fight to maintain its dominance, 
or even control, of Sri Lankan 
airspace.
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The Sri Lankan Air Force was initially slow to adapt. Air Chief Marshal Roshan Goonetilleke observed,
At first the military was developing its aerial capabilities as a reaction to the enhancements and development 
the LTTE was doing. The LTTE was also developing its military capability every year with new equipment 
and increased recruitment. At that time, I must say, we were reactive. We were not prepared. We were 
not proactive. It was only when the LTTE procured new weaponry, we armed ourselves in reaction. 
Even passenger-carrying helicopters were fitted with guns, and we were compelled to adopt many 
similar ad hoc arrangements to counter the threat. Well, we went on; finally, at a particular time when 
the terrorist acquired missiles, we got into a very difficult situation, as we were not prepared for that.2
The	SLAF	Adapts	to	Fulfill	Its	Missions
With the escalation of violence in 2005 and the breakdown of a cease-fire agreement between the LTTE and Sri Lanka, 
President Mahinda Rajapaksa and his defense secretary spearheaded a full-scale counterinsurgency campaign, which 
eventually defeated the LTTE and the insurgency. For this successful campaign, the Sri Lankan Air Force was utilized in a 
more indirect and population-centric method than had been the case earlier in the conflict.Air Superiority
Air superiority and dominance is the primary objective of any air force. But for the Sri Lankan Air Force, achieving air 
superiority was difficult because its aircraft did not have the capability to intercept the type of low-flying civilian aircraft 
that the LTTE adapted for its attacks. After the first two attacks by the LTTE in 2007, the SLAF came under sharp criticism 
and quickly reorganized. It purchased six Chinese F7G interceptors capable of engaging the LTTE planes, and installed air 
defenses in Colombo and its suburbs. Additionally, the Sri Lankan government established links with international part-
ners to train and assist the Air Force to counter the LTTE anti-air capability. 
Logistics
While logistically supporting government COIN efforts was a primary role for the SLAF from the onset of the conflict, 
the Air Force modernized its equipment with the purchase of two Lockheed C-130 Hercules and 11 Chinese heavy-lift 
aircraft. These acquisitions enabled it to support the requirements of the high-intensity military operations of the final 
phase (2005–2009) of combat. 
Close Air Support
To enhance its air-to-ground attack capabilities, the Air Force purchased Russian-built Mil Mi-24 gunships (attack helicop-
ters) and Israeli-built Kfirs. The SLAF also bought Russian MiG-27 ground-attack aircraft. While the Sri Lankan Air Force 
had always had a close air support role, the most critical aspect of this mission 
involved coordination with ground troops. Recognizing this, the Sri Lankan mili-
tary increased training for both pilots and ground troops.
Precision Bombing
Prior to 2005, the SLAF conducted bombing raids without air surveillance or 
ground support. These indiscriminate, imprecise raids on areas under enemy 
control were often counterproductive, serving to reinforce LTTE propaganda 
that highlighted the government’s brutality. The damage caused by these 
attacks radicalized the Tamil population in those areas and generated recruit-
ment opportunities for the insurgents. The LTTE also publicized the bombings 
After 2005, the SLAF intro-
duced precision strike muni-
tions and incorporated tar-
geting from ground support 
units, which resulted in less 
unintended damage during 
air raids and helped to under-
mine the LTTE’s propaganda.
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through their media outlets to generate sympathy among the Tamil diaspora, and attract more funding. Although the 
horrific reports on websites like TamilNet, Sri Lankan Genocide, TamilNation, and others were largely fabricated, the de-
struction caused by the SLAF bombing raids gave them an air of truth.3
After 2005, the SLAF introduced precision-strike munitions and incorporated targeting from ground support units, which 
resulted in less unintended damage during air raids and helped to undermine the LTTE’s propaganda. The deep- 
penetration units of the Army and Navy were trained to direct precision air strikes on enemy targets.4 In November 2007, 
the Army’s Long Range Patrol (LRP) team guided the SLAF in an operation that destroyed the bunker of Suppayya 
Paramu Tamilchelvam, the leader of the LTTE’s political wing, and killed him, without causing damage to any surrounding 
house or person.5
Intelligence, Surveillance and  Reconnaissance (ISR)
The ability to gather ISR using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) was an 
asset that the government and its military leadership quickly adopted to 
great effect. The Air Force integrated its UAV capabilities with a digital 
infrastructure; a secure, high-speed data transfer network; and real-time 
data links from live feeds to create a centralized command and control 
center in Colombo. This allowed personnel in Air Force headquarters, 
the president, and the defense secretary to obtain a first-hand view of 
operations. Later, this capability was extended to other military services. 
At the division commander level of the Army, field commanders were 
able to gather real-time inputs from behind enemy lines. This informa-
tion helped ground troops avoid inflicting civilian casualties and 
collateral damage, and also enabled them to secure escape routes for 
civilians trapped by the LTTE. One Air Force pilot described the operations this way:
Beechcraft or UAV surveillance aircraft remained over the targets while interdictions were taking 
place. This enabled first-hand battle damage assessment as well as contributed towards further 
improving targeting accuracy. In addition, the greatest achievement was ensuring positive identification 
of civilian settlements, enabling the ground forces to avoid them during engagement. Last minute 
changes were made to battle plans based on live footage from aerial observation platforms.6
ISR also helped counter enemy propaganda. The government, at times, provided video from unmanned aerial vehicles 
and other aerial surveillance tools to the international and national media to disprove the LTTE’s claims that the 
Sri Lankan military forces were engaged in genocide. The ability to show not only the citizens of Sri Lanka, but also the 
population of the world that the military’s targets were legitimate enemy locations and not civilians (as had been claimed 
by the LTTE’s media and its international supporters) proved crucial for gaining and maintaining support for the govern-
ment’s military campaign. 
Search, Rescue, Medevac, and Infiltration/Exfiltration
Over the course of the conflict, the Air Force mastered this range of missions. 
Initially, there had been limited coordination between ground and air forces, 
and pilots were not well trained for these types of missions. These problems 
led to instances in which deep-penetration troops were lost, or sometimes had 
to carry their wounded comrades for more than 25 miles before they were 
picked up by friendly units.7 The ability to infiltrate deep inside enemy terrain 
was vital to the success of the military offensive. It also raised the morale of the 
troops, who knew military units in distress could be rescued even if they were 
miles inside enemy territory.
The ability to infiltrate deep inside 
enemy terrain was vital to the suc-
cess of the military offensive. It also 
raised the morale of the troops, 
who knew military units in distress 
could be rescued even if they were 
miles inside enemy territory.
Medical camps… to help com-
munities affected by the war, 
and the ability to evacuate 
critically injured civilians by 
air… were welcome develop-
ments for the local people. 
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The Sri Lankan government understood the need to quickly legitimize its authority in liberated areas that had previ-
ously supported the LTTE. Unlike previous governments, which had waited for military operations to conclude before 
trying to establish civilian authority in these areas, the current government was keen to extend its writ while military ac-
tivities were still underway. To do so, the government took advantage of the Air Force’s ability to gain access to these 
denied areas. 
As soon as the eastern areas of the country were liberated, the Sri Lankan president and other government officials used 
the Air Force for passage into these regions, even holding a cabinet meeting in the disputed city of Trincomalee in 2006. 
Colombo hoped that bringing in government officials to reestablish civilian administrative operations, which had been 
neglected or abandoned in areas under enemy control, could help normalize the situation and re-legitimize the rule of 
the government in the eyes of the population. The government also invited national and international media along, to 
show the world and the nation’s citizenry that the government was now in control of formerly contested areas. 
The SLAF also helped win the population’s support in these areas through its humanitarian efforts. Medical camps to 
help communities affected by the war, and the ability to evacuate critically injured civilians by air for proper medical care 
in the capital, were welcome developments for the local people. Air Force logistical capabilities transported essential 
supplies to liberated areas even while land and sea routes remained dangerous or denied. 
In the end, a growing appreciation for the utility of air power in combination with COIN efforts helped make it possible 
for the Sri Lankan government to overcome the LTTE. It is rare that a terrorist organization is defeated through military 
means, and as this discussion makes clear, the Sri Lankan Air Force played an integral part in the government’s eventual 
victory. 
Notes
1 Extracted from the Humanitarian Operation Fact Analysis, a document distributed in 2001 to the heads of foreign missions 
in Sri Lanka by the Defense Ministry. Most of these civilian aircraft were fitted with improvised bomb-carrying and release 
mechanisms.
2 From a 2009 interview with Chief Marshal Roshan Goonetilleke, RWP & BAR, VSV, USP, NDC, PSC, the current joint chief of staff 
and former commander of the Sri Lankan Air Force. Goonetileke commanded the SLAF in the final battles against the LTTE from 
2006 to the end of the insurgency in 2009. He presented these ideas in an interview shortlly after the President of Sri Lanka 
declared an end to military operations and victory against the LTTE in 2009.
3 “Sri Lanka Air Force Bombs Schools in Jaffna,” (November/December 1993), retrieved from TamilNation.org website: http://tam-
ilnation.co/indictment/indict071.htm, (accessed December 6, 2011).
4 The Deep Penetration Units of the Sri Lankan military conducted operations inside enemy-held territory. These teams included 
Sri Lankan Army Commando Regiment Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) Unit, SF Long Range Patrol (LRP) group, and Sri 
Lankan Navy SBS LRP group. They were trained to direct air strikes on identified targets inside enemy territory.
5 Brigadier SP Thamilchelvan was head of the LTTE’s political wing and one of the group’s top leaders. On November 2, 2007, a 
precision attack on his hideout killed him and five other LTTE leaders. “Senior Tamil Tiger Leader Killed,” BBC News, Nov. 2, 2007:  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7074450.stm.
6 These views on the development of ISR and its effect on the final stages of the war were expressed by a Sri Lankan Air Force 
pilot, who requested to remain anonymous.
7 As a member of a Sri Lankan Navy SBS unit, the author saw, heard about, and experienced such situations. He also is aware of 
the mental impact on troops who know that air support is available when they are behind enemy lines.
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LTC Arjan Hilaj, Albanian Army
For almost 11 years, coalition forces in Afghanistan have been battling an insurgency in a very complicated environment 
that includes Islamic religious fanatics, warlords, and common criminals. Kinetic actions are not enough to prevail. In this 
protracted war, winning the support of the population is imperative.
Former International Security Assistance Force commander General David Petraeus, in his 2010 guidance on the conduct 
of counterinsurgency operations against insurgents, placed renewed stress on the importance of winning the hearts and 
minds of the Afghan people if operations are to succeed: “The decisive terrain 
is the human terrain. The people are the center of gravity. Only by providing 
them security and earning their trust and confidence can the Afghan govern-
ment and ISAF prevail.”1 With these guidelines in mind, a combined Albanian–
U.S. Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) called “Striking Eagles 
1” conducted an operation codenamed “Jatagani” in mid-December 2011. The 
operation, which I led, was conducted in conjunction with the Afghan National 
Army (ANA) battalion with which the OMLT was embedded, and with other 
U.S. Marine and Army personnel.
The commander’s plan for the operation included the conduct of a “key leader engagement” with the elders of the vil-
lage of Shine Shavara, as well as the distribution of humanitarian aid (school and hygiene kits) to the village’s children, 
and medical check-ups for adults and children. It was hoped that these efforts would extend the influence of the Afghan 
government and army and the coalition forces, increase military control in an area hostile to the Afghan military and 
government, and undermine support for the insurgents by 
projecting a favorable image of coalition forces to friendly, 
neutral, and hostile audiences. All of this effort, ultimately, was 
designed to “win the hearts and minds” by removing the root 
causes of unrest on which the insurgency fed.2
Preparing	in	the	Dark
Despite making all possible preparations to maximize the 
chances for a successful mission, Operation Jatagani would 
prove yet again that in the battlefield environment, the “fog of 
war” persists. In this case, however, the fog of war also ob-
scured the “human terrain.”
Initial coordination for this operation was started in November 
2011 by the U.S. deputy commander of the OMLT, who tapped 
LTC Hilaj with his ANA counterpart talking 
to the elders of the villages.
Despite making all possible 
preparations to maximize the 
chances for a successful mis-
sion... the “fog of war” per-
sisted... [and] obscured the 
“human terrain.”
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into the vast logistic supply lines of the U.S. Forces–Afghanistan to secure the necessary humanitarian aid the operation 
would deliver. Meanwhile, I continued to work out the specifics of the operation with the Afghan battalion commander. 
We selected this particular village, Shine Shavara, because reports indicated that the population was not friendly and 
because our interpreters spoke of the villagers in contemptible terms. The villagers were ethnic Pashtuns, former refu-
gees in Pakistan who had settled in the area. Reconnaissance missions conducted by my team members confirmed that 
the villagers were hostile to coalition forces. For example, on two occasions, children threw stones at our vehicles as we 
passed through the village. In general, children are very good indicators of the overall mood of the people.
One of the difficulties that hindered our planning was a lack of useful intelligence. 
From our side, we developed the best intelligence we could. A week prior to the 
operation, we conducted site reconnaissance to locate the best possible place to 
conduct our key leader meeting with the village elders, and to determine where 
we should distribute our humanitarian aid and medical assistance. In addition, we 
contacted a human terrain team at our superior command, but found that they 
not only had no information about the village, but did not even know where this 
village was located. Our Afghan counterparts were not much help either. Bearing 
all this uncertainty in mind, I sized up my group’s ability to cope with unpredict-
able events.
The operation itself bore several tactical risks. First, we needed to ensure that the ANA forces would maintain proper 
fire discipline. (ANA soldiers had a reputation for opening fire at everything moving in front of their gun barrels when 
under attack.) Second, we were concerned about maintaining effective command and control, especially as we had 
never trained or conducted operations with more than half of OMLT. Lastly, the terrain itself, particularly the poor road 
conditions, posed risks. As one Afghan proverb puts it, “When God created the world he had some spare rocks and steep 
mountains. With those, the Almighty created Afghanistan.”3
The	Mission
Early in the morning on the first day of our mission, our coali-
tion vehicles were lined up in column formation waiting for 
our Afghan counterparts, who, not surprisingly, arrived late. In 
all, 83 soldiers and 16 vehicles assembled for the operation. 
Before getting underway, I gave a short briefing to the ANA 
commander to reiterate all essential tasks to be performed.
Our first contact with the population occurred in a village 
adjacent to our objective. Initially indifferent to our presence, 
kids followed our slow-moving column through the narrow 
roads, which were barely wide enough to provide a few inches 
of clearance from the mud-brick walls on either side of the 
vehicles.
Immediately after we arrived at the main village and had 
established a security perimeter, I, as the commander of the operation, went to meet the elders of the village in front 
of the village’s mosque. After the formal greeting and offer of tea from my hosts, I explained why we were there. While 
I was speaking about the benefits the villagers would get from supporting the Afghan government, the ANA, and the 
coalition forces, the Malik (the most senior among the elders) told me that “not every Pashtun or person who lives in 
LTC Hilaj briefs his ANA counterpart before 
departing for the mission.
“When God created the 
world He had some spare 
rocks and steep mountains. 
With those, the Almighty 
created Afghanistan.”  
   – Afghan proverb
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the mountains supports the Taliban insurgency.” All they wanted were better living conditions for themselves and their 
children. I also learned that other coalition forces had visited this village before us, but had not fulfilled their promises.
Despite our intentions and efforts, the population remained wary of us, at best, 
and some were openly hostile. Again, the children proved to be a useful indicator 
of the mood of the people. During our mission, the children were the most aggres-
sive individuals and the hardest to control. Wave after wave of them stormed the 
site where the humanitarian assistance kits were being distributed and the area 
where the medics were dispensing medical aid. One of our vehicles was damaged 
by rocks thrown by children who did not receive the kits, and some of our gunners 
were slightly injured by the rocks.
What	We	Can	Do	Better
In our post-mission review, we discussed several lessons 
learned. One was that small decisions, like parking the vehicles 
close to a house, could be considered tactically sound but 
could alienate the population if females were present in the 
yard. We also realized that giving water bottles to the children 
led to fights over these prizes and to resentment of our forces 
by the children who did not receive any water. Additionally, 
we determined it was better to have the ANA distribute the 
humanitarian assistance because they were more familiar with 
the cultural nuances and potential cultural landmines. One 
successful aspect of the mission was that the Afghan com-
mander expressed his readiness to go out on such missions in 
the future, after coming to appreciate that these missions are 
more likely to win over the Afghan population than are guns.
From our perspective as coalition forces, it is important to 
understand that the human factor in counterinsurgency is the 
principal element that dictates the course of events. Understanding culture and being flexible with the human terrain 
are the most important “weapons” that can guarantee long-term success in the modern battle space, which so often is 
where people are living.
Notes
1 David Petraeus, ISAF Commander, “COMISAF’s Counterinsurgency guidance,” 1 August 2010. Available at: http://graphics8.
nytimes.com/packages/pdf/world/2010/COMISAF-MEMO.pdf (accessed April 12, 2012).
2 Robert Mockaitis,  Resolving Insurgencies: http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/ (accessed Dec. 15, 2011).
3 US Air Force, Afghanistan Handbook, 2010. 
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All photos courtesy of the author.
There are no roads in this sector of rural Afghanistan. Here, 
OMLT vehicles are passing through a dry river bed.
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Thon Agany Ayiei
The deliberate killing on December 25, 2011, of the leader of Darfur’s Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), Khalil 
Ibrahim, inspired mixed reporting at first. In their initial reports, the Sudanese government in Khartoum and the Sudan 
Armed Forces (SAF), claimed that Khalil died due to the wounds 
he sustained during a clash between his forces and the SAF 
while fighting his way toward Kordofan to join the Sudan Peo-
ple’s Liberation Movement-North, which was already fighting 
the SAF in that area. JEM, however, disputed the SAF’s account 
about how its leader died, saying that he was assassinated in a 
sophisticated airstrike of a type not previously seen in Sudan. 
On Tuesday, the 28th of December, 2011, the defense minister 
of the Republic of Sudan, Abdul Rahim Mohamed, publicly an-
nounced that Khalil was killed in an air strike carried out by the 
SAF. The minister added that “the tracking of a phone call had 
enabled the army to pinpoint the location of Khalil and strike 
him.” This account confirmed JEM’s statement and disproved 
the SAF’s initial account of how Khalil died. At the same time, 
the defense minister praised the work of Khartoum’s intel-
ligence services, claiming that the killing of Khalil represented 
the “climax of a great intelligence operation.” He further as-
serted that “killing Khalil was tantamount to beheading the 
rebellion in Darfur.” This statement suggests that Khalil’s killing resulted from a military analysis of JEM’s center of grav-
ity. It is worth noting that to determine the center of gravity requires looking at the components of a particular force and 
determining its strongest component which, if eliminated, would result in the destruction of that force. 
After Khalil’s targeted assassination, Khartoum vowed to destroy JEM forces before they reached their destination, which 
was thought to be Southern Kordofan. However, later reports from Khartoum confirmed that JEM forces had reached 
their destination, and that they were now at the border with South Sudan. So, did Khartoum miscalculate JEM’s center of 
gravity? It would seem so. 
The focus of this short article is not whether the killing of Khalil gave Khartoum an advantage in any way, or whether his 
demise is going to end JEM’s armed struggle. Rather, the purpose is to draw attention to the sophisticated technologi-
cal capability used in his assassination, and ask whether South Sudan, as a direct neighbor of Sudan, can learn anything 
from it, and to what extent such capabilities should cause South Sudan and Khartoum’s other neighbors concern.
Sophisticated assassinations such as the one that eliminated Khalil—tracking targets by electronic devices and eliminat-
ing them by air without any error of any kind—have until now been carried out only by security and intelligence agencies 
of the most powerful and developed countries. This technology was used by the United States military to track down  
Al Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden in the Tora Bora mountains of Afghanistan in 2001, forcing him and his fighters to stop 
Khalil Ibrahim, assassinated leader of the Justice and 
Equality Movement (JEM).
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using electronic communications. Thus, for Khartoum to demonstrate 
such a capability poses a major question: Is anything, or anyone, 
within reach of Khartoum safe? What about targets of value to Khar-
toum in South Sudan? 
Juba and Khartoum have been engaged in a security tug-of-war since 
the two countries separated in July 2011. The revelation of this new 
targeting capability could set in motion a regional arms race, in which 
not only those two countries but possibly others as well compete to 
field more weapons, larger armies, and gain superior military technol-
ogy. Remote targeting is an escalation that could well force South Su-
dan to look for ways to counter it, because it poses a potential threat 
to South Sudan’s national security. 
Sudan, a state that is run by realists—elites who put national interest 
and security above anything else—recently openly complained that a 
visit by South Sudan’s President, Salva Kiir, to Israel posed a national 
security threat to Sudan. This complaint serves as testimony that 
Khartoum is watching Juba’s security and international moves very 
closely. Of course, Khartoum’s warning to Juba about its relations with Jerusalem breaches international norms since 
South Sudan is an independent state and has every right to foster diplomatic relations with any country it chooses to in 
the international arena. 
President Kiir, for his part, pointed out that Sudan has been South Sudan’s “main challenge” since independence. Events 
such as Khartoum’s confiscation of ships bearing oil 
from the South; the SAF’s occupation of the disputed 
border town of Abyei; its ground attacks on the South 
Sudan town of Jau and air bombardment of other border 
towns; and Khartoum’s support of militias in the South, 
all demonstrate that Khartoum has been not only a dif-
ficult, but also a dangerous neighbor.* 
Given Khartoum‘s vigilance about South Sudan’s se-
curity and international arrangements, it would be 
short-sighted for Juba not to look just as closely into 
Khartoum’s security affairs, and to be especially con-
cerned about what the killing of Khalil reveals:  
Khartoum’s adoption of and proven willingness to use a 
new military capability, one that has the potential to  
change the sub-regional security equation altogether. 
Note
* This article was submitted to CTX well before the most recent clashes between Sudan and South Sudan took place.—Ed.
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p. 16 image copyright Agence-France Presse 
p. 17 image Courtesy Alriyadh
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COL Sean Corrigan, USA
The leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran has empowered Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), or Pasda-
ran, to such an extent that the IRGC has become the center of gravity not only for the security, but also for the economy 
of the regime. This power, enabled by a lack of credible political checks and balances or separation of powers, is a critical 
strength for the Pasdaran and the current regime. However, the IRGC has a number of exploitable vulnerabilities. While it 
self-promotes and is portrayed domestically as the ideologically pure guardian of the Iranian revolution and defender of 
Islam, the IRGC is neither omnipotent nor omnipresent. Rather, the Pasdaran and its vast network of alumni and advo-
cates are subject to factionalism, internal strife, and incompetence. This article describes the impact of the IRGC on Iran’s 
security and economy, assesses the organization’s vulnerabilities, and offers options for exploiting these vulnerabilities.1
Creation	of	the	IRGC
As Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini consolidated power after deposing Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in 1979, he balanced 
the counterrevolutionary threat he perceived from Iran’s conventional military with the IRGC, a trusted parallel military 
structure beholden to him and loyal to his revolutionary principles. In 
order to maintain internal order and suppress dissent, Khomeini also 
formalized the multiple post-revolution militias by organizing them into 
the Basij (Mobilization of the Oppressed). Even though the IRGC is consti-
tutionally directed to coordinate with Iran’s conventional military forces, 
and is nominally subordinate to a joint headquarters that oversees the 
security services and law enforcement forces, the Pasdaran answers 
directly only to the republic’s Supreme Leader, currently Ayatollah Ali al 
Khamenei. This direct access to the Supreme Leader, combined with his 
consistent and considerable support for the IRGC, makes the Pasdaran 
peerless among the military, intelligence, law enforcement, and security services in Iran. The placement of current and 
former Pasdaran and Basij commanders and officers throughout all of Iran’s other security organs mitigates any internal 
resistance to the Pasdaran’s independence and its unique access to Khamenei.
The Artesh, Iran’s conventional military ground force, consists of approximately 220,000 troops, as compared with the 
IRGC’s 125,000. The Artesh is more heavily armed, while the Pasdaran maintains primacy over, and responsibility for, 
Iran’s most critical national security initiatives, including cyber warfare, the intermediate-range ballistic missile program, 
and maritime security in the Arabian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. In addition, the Pasdaran claims an expansive and 
growing role in domestic security, and is widely assumed to be intimately involved in Iran’s nuclear program. As the entity 
responsible for Iran’s ballistic missile program as well as its asymmetric warfare capabilities, the Pasdaran has the means 
to deliver critical or subcritical fissile-material payloads by traditional or unconventional means. The IRGC’s responsibil-
ity for military and technological research and testing suggests its likely involvement in any possible current or future 
nuclear weapons development.
Since October 2007, the IRGC has also formally controlled the Basij, a geographically based reserve force of 90,000 which 
can mobilize up to one million personnel. Following anti-regime riots in 1994, the Basij has assumed a larger role in inter-
nal security, receiving training in riot control in order to quell student or opposition uprisings.2 The Basij also provides the 
IRGC with a network of eyes and ears across Iran, and maintains a presence in all major universities.
The Pasdaran answers directly 
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IRGC	Military	Doctrine
The IRGC’s military doctrine emphasizes asymmetric or irregular warfare as a means to counter a perceived techno-
logical capability and capacity gap in the event of conventional conflict on Iranian soil with other states. In August 2005, 
when he was the commander of the IRGC Center for Strategy, Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari stated, “As the enemy 
is far more advanced technologically than we are, we have been using what is called asymmetric warfare meth-
ods. …Our forces are now well prepared for it.”3 The driving principle of the IRGC’s military doctrine is to undermine a 
stronger adversary’s will to continue fighting, rather than defeat en-
emy military forces in conventional terms. The tenets of this doctrine 
include, but are not limited to, the following: decentralized command 
and control of dispersed forces to mitigate an enemy’s superior air-
power and dominance of the electro-magnetic spectrum; incorpora-
tion of unconventional and terrorist tactics in response options; concen-
tration of capabilities against an enemy’s strategic weak points, which 
are not necessarily military in nature; offensive retaliatory strikes 
against the enemy outside the war zone; undermining the enemy’s 
national popular support through information warfare; and an emphasis on the power of religious zeal and martyrdom 
to bring victory.4 The IRGC maintains the ability and capacity to take the conflict outside Iran’s borders through uncon-
ventional tactics and asymmetric warfare. The Pasdaran’s Qods (Jerusalem) Force is its primary tool in that endeavor.
The	Doctrine’s	Vulnerabilities
For all of its influence among the military organs of national power, the IRGC and its asymmetric warfare doctrine never-
theless present multiple vulnerabilities. The IRGC’s blatant disregard for constitutionally mandated command and control 
structures, its independence from the Ministry of Defense, and its liberal interpretation of its authority put the Pasdaran 
on shaky legal ground. Iranian liberals and oppositionists make a strong argument that the IRGC has exceeded its author-
ity to the point of acting as an extralegal paramilitary element. Mohsen Sazegara, one of the IRGC’s founding members 
and now a political dissident, said of the Pasdaran, “I don’t know of any other organization in any country like the Revo-
lutionary Guards. It’s something like the Communist Party, the KGB, a business complex, and the mafia.”5
Parallel IRGC and conventional Artesh military structures create inefficien-
cies, violate unity of command, and promote factionalism. The Pasdaran’s 
ascendance has come at the expense of both the Artesh and domestic law 
enforcement forces in terms of resources, authority, and political capital. 
The resulting friction among the security services has resulted in poor co-
ordination, lack of integration, and a situation that is ultimately unsustain-
able.6 The IRGC has long promoted itself as the Republic’s savior, based on 
its performance in the Iran–Iraq war. This implies that the Artesh and the 
Iranian Navy failed the Republic, necessitating the Pasdaran’s and Basij’s 
heroic sacrifices and martyrdom in order to preserve the revolution. An alternative viewpoint is that the IRGC inserted 
itself into the forefront of that war precisely to secure its enduring prominence after the conflict. Additionally, military 
analysts both inside and outside Iran contend that the IRGC’s human-wave tactics unnecessarily prolonged the conflict 
at an exorbitant cost in blood and treasure.7 The Pasdaran’s revisionist historical portrayal of its role in the Iran–Iraq war 
is vulnerable to the available facts concerning its actual performance and motives. Many military personnel and civil-
ians still remember the Pasdaran’s performance in that war differently, and if this truth were brought to light, it would 
severely undermine the IRGC’s claimed historical justification for its current prominence.
The asymmetric warfare doctrine developed by Hassan Abbassi and Major General Jafari, and now being implemented 
by the Pasdaran, suggests further potentially useful points of vulnerability. The acknowledged promotion of terrorism as 
a pillar of the strategy constitutes an explicit violation of the Law of Armed Conflict by any interpretation of international 
The driving principle of the IRGC’s 
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law. This violation effectively isolates Iran from any external state support in the event of conflict, or limits its support-
ers to a very small community of like-minded states and state-sponsored terrorist groups. Though willing and grateful to 
accept Iranian state support today, its surrogates and proxies act in their own interests, and it is not certain they can be 
relied on in the context of a larger conflict.8
Another point of potential vulnerability lies in the recruiting and manning of the Basij militia units, whose rank and file 
are subject to varying degrees of tribal, sect, and local loyalties. During the 1994 Qazvin riots, local IRGC and Basij units 
acted independently and demonstrated their conflicting loyalties by refusing to fire on unarmed protestors. This insubor-
dination required the IRGC to import Basij units from other provinces to quell the riots.9 An undetermined but significant 
percentage of the Basij rank and file join purely for the economic, educational, and social benefits rather than commit-
ment to the regime’s ideology or belief in the virtue of martyrdom.10 It may be possible to drive a wedge between the 
Basij and the IRGC by illuminating the fact that the purported glory of martyrdom applies mostly to the Basij rank and 
file and not the powerbrokers among the IRGC.
Role of the IRGC in Suppressing Internal Dissent
The IRGC (and Basij’s) role in crushing opposition inside Iran, in accordance with 
General Jafari’s intention to prevent an Iranian “Velvet Revolution,” offers possibly 
the Pasdaran’s greatest vulnerability. The protests that followed the June 2009 
presidential election continued into December, and exposed divisions within the 
IRGC. Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Mahdi, a 30-year veteran of the Pasdaran 
and formerly head of IRGC investigations into threats against the regime, is now 
working as a political dissident and activist outside of Iran. In a 2010 interview with 
the Guardian news organization, he claimed that more than one third of the Pasda-
ran are now against the regime.
The current members of the Revolutionary Guard are saying that they have become very 
disheartened. The situation is becoming unbearable. …The regime is witnessing its 
destruction. The regime is prepared to instill fear and insecurity into the people within Iran  
in order to ensure its stability. It has got to that stage. The regime is sinking.11
Mohammad Hussein Torkaman was the Basij officer responsible for security logistics for Iran’s Supreme Leader and presi-
dent during the June 2009 elections and the protests that followed. After witnessing the IRGC’s methods of crushing the 
dissenters, he also defected. In that same Guardian interview, Torkaman stated:
After the 2009 election, supreme Leader and President brought in foreign mercenaries to protect 
them because they were uncertain of their own security forces. …The forces they had chosen to do 
the shooting at people were from the Qods Force. The majority of them are Lebanese or Palestinian. 
They don’t speak Farsi, the Persian language. These were the ones who were given permission to 
open fire. …They had built places within the prisons, specifically for torturing people. There’s a 
basement in Evin prison… it was extremely bad. Disease was spreading because of the prisoners’ 
open wounds, which had been caused by torture.12
Though the Pasdaran outwardly presents an image of a tightly knit and cohesive force that is ideologically, theologically, and 
politically homogeneous, its role in quelling domestic revolts and crushing opposition movements has divided the ranks, 
contradicting this monolithic image. IRGC members’ conflicting loyalties and doubts over the Pasdaran’s commitment to its 
original intended purpose present real vulnerabilities for the Iranian regime’s primary military instrument of power.
The protests that followed 
the June 2009 presidential 
election continued into  
December, and exposed 
divisions within the IRGC.
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The IRGC’s strategy of asymmetric warfare and its open advocacy of terrorism as a pillar of this strategy also have cost 
Iran in the international political sphere. The U.S. Department of State, in its 2010 annual country reports on terrorism, 
again designated Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism, as it has done since 1984. The designation triggers mandatory sanc-
tions on economic assistance, the export of dual-use items, and arms sales to Iran.13 While the designation has no binding 
effect on governments or private entities outside the United States, it is a powerful tool for isolating a country politically 
and economically. European Union and U.S. Treasury Department sanctions against IRGC leaders Jafari and Soleimani 
for their material support of Syria’s violent actions against protestors amplify the message that there is a political and 
economic price to pay for the IRGC’s strategy.14 This offers yet another exploitable point of vulnerability: The Pasdaran’s 
military strategy has a direct and negative impact on Iran’s ability to fully use its political and economic tools.
The	IRGC’s	Economic	Empire
The IRGC’s expansion beyond the roles and tasks tradition-
ally associated with a military or security service is most 
visible in its dominant role in Iran’s economy. Leverag-
ing its self-proclaimed popularity and influence after the 
Iran–Iraq war, the Pasdaran initially entered the economic 
realm under the auspices of guiding the country’s recon-
struction efforts. Since then, it has steadily expanded its 
economic influence with the support and approval of the 
Supreme Leader. The IRGC’s influence spans virtually all 
sectors of the economy. Khatam ol-Anbia, Persian for “Seal 
of the Prophet,” is the largest contracting business within 
a vast network owned and/or controlled by the IRGC. The 
IRGC owns and operates multiple port facilities and maintains its own banking system. In addition, in September 2009, 
the IRGC purchased a 50-percent controlling interest in Iran Telecommunications Company.15  The IRGC’s greatest eco-
nomic instrument by far, however, is its influence over the energy sector, which accounts for more than 80 percent of the 
regime’s revenue.16 From 2005 to 2010, the IRGC and its affiliates won 750 oil, gas, and construction contracts.17
Alongside its legitimate enterprises, the IRGC, through its ownership of ports, its influence over airlines, and its status of 
near-impunity among Iran’s law enforcement services, has both means and opportunities to play a dominant role in Iran’s 
black- and gray-market economies as well. There are multiple motives for this involvement: personal profit for senior 
officers; funding and acquisition of weapon systems subject to international sanctions; bribery of political and clerical 
officials in order to maintain and increase the IRGC’s economic and political position; support for covert initiatives abroad 
and the IRGC’s nuclear research program; provision of financial support to IRGC veterans and their families; and expan-
sion of the Basij through financial incentives.18
Economic Policies Spur Antagonism
By militarizing such a significant portion of Iran’s national economy, the IRGC has made itself politically vulnerable in 
a number of ways. In particular, the Pasdaran’s extra-legal economic activity has not gone unnoticed by Iran’s elected 
parliamentarians. In reference to the IRGC’s black- and gray-market activities, Majlis (Parliament) member Ali Ghanbari 
openly criticized the Pasdaran,
Unfortunately, one third of the imported goods are delivered through the black market, underground 
economy, and illegal jetties. Appointed institutions [by Supreme Leader Khamenei] that don’t obey 
the [rules of] the government and have control over the means of power [violence], institutions that 
are mainly military, are responsible [for those illegal activities].19
Alongside its legitimate enterprises, the 
IRGC, through its ownership of ports, its in-
fluence over airlines, and its status of near-
impunity among Iran’s law enforcement 
services, has both means and opportunities 
to play a dominant role in Iran’s black- and 
gray-market economies as well.
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Former Majlis speaker and reformist cleric Mehdi Karrubi accused the IRGC of running 60 jetties without proper govern-
mental supervision. Another member of Parliament quantified his estimate of the IRGC’s illicit economic activity thus: 
“invisible jetties... and the invisible hand of the mafia control 68 
percent of Iran’s entire exports.”20 An outspoken critic of the re-
gime and the Pasdaran, and previously a reformist candidate for 
the presidency, Mehdi Karrubi has remained under house arrest 
since February 2011.
Corruption and personal enrichment invite contempt and com-
petition among senior IRGC officers, and potentially create a 
wedge between the leadership and the rank and file of the orga-
nization. The slow deterioration of Iran’s once influential bazaar-
merchant middle class, through the IRGC’s control of the underground economy and its militarization of the private 
sector, has also alienated a large segment of the population accustomed to a tradition of relatively free enterprise. In a 
formal letter to the government, 29 private businessmen openly questioned the constitutionality as well as the effective-
ness of the IRGC’s economic activities:
Responsibilities [of the military and civilian institutions] are well defined in the Constitution. [Moreover] 
the goal of the “Next 20 Years’ Economic Projection,” is to make the government smaller. [We ask 
the question] whether it makes sense economically and technically, to award [all the] large scale 
projects to the military or paramilitary organizations?21
Ways	to	Exploit	IRGC	Vulnerabilities
There are a number of ways in which the United States and its allies might exploit the IRGC’s vulnerabilities. Foremost, 
the allies should maintain technical and physical superiority in the region, providing a credible deterrent to both the IRGC 
threat of asymmetric warfare and terrorism, and malevolent activities in neighboring nations. Through theater security 
cooperation in multiple geographic combatant commands, the U.S. Departments of Defense, State, Justice, and the Trea-
sury should also continue to support improvements in counterterrorism capability and capacity among allied nations, in 
order to deter the Pasdaran’s implementation of terrorism as a military tactic. Within the U.S. Central Command area 
of responsibility, specifically the nations bordering the Arabian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz, military sales, training, exer-
cises, and intelligence sharing should all be coordinated to counter the IRGC’s asymmetric warfare doctrine and its naval 
swarm tactics. Washington could also make a case for designating the entire Pasdaran and Basij as terrorist organizations 
due to their known sponsorship and training of terrorists, leaving them exempt from the protections normally afforded 
uniformed armed forces under the Geneva Conventions and the Laws of Armed Conflict.
Additionally, the U.S. military should consider developing a campaign plan based on segregating and isolating the IRGC 
and Basij from the more conventional Artesh, and driving a wedge between the elite Pasdaran leadership and the rank 
and file who were expected to martyr themselves on the IRGC’s behalf. The Artesh should be assured of its place as an 
element of the armed services in a future sovereign Iran that is free from the Pasdaran and its leaders. The United States 
can also communicate directly to the Basij that mass attrition of its rank and file during missions might benefit the IRGC, 
but not the Iranian people or anyone else.
The United States and its allies should also consider improving the capability and capacity of their military informa-
tion support operations, tailoring them to quickly achieve and maintain information superiority just as militaries would 
normally strive to achieve air superiority against a traditional adversary. The tools and skills required in the Iranian case, 
however, are not necessarily the same as those used in Iraq and Afghanistan and cannot be rapidly produced. Early in-
vestment in Farsi language training, along with a solid understanding of Persian history and culture, are vital for effective 
planning and engagement.
Corruption and personal enrichment 
invite contempt and competition among 
senior IRGC officers, and create a poten-
tial wedge between the leadership and 
the rank and file of the organization. 
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The extent and corruption of the IRGC economic enterprise must be laid bare to both the Iranian people and the rest 
of the world. Information and intelligence sharing among allies can provide the transparency that the IRGC has avoided 
through its use and abuse of foundations, cooperatives, front companies, and the black market. Iran’s private business 
sector and bazaar middle class should be given the information they need to fully grasp the unfair business practices the 
Pasdaran enterprise exploits to enrich its elite and finance its consolidation of power.
Economic sanctions should extend to all bonyads (charitable trusts), banks, and cooperatives associated with this vast 
network. Although current sanctions are having some effect, they cannot prevent the Pasdaran from generating and 
laundering the revenue required to maintain and expand its domestic and international influence unless regional and 
international players such as the European Union, MERCOSUR, the African Union, ASEAN, and the Gulf Cooperation 
Council, as well as member nations of the World Trade Organization, agree to honor sanctions against the entirety of the 
Pasdaran’s economic enterprise. The development of alternative markets and sources of oil and gas for countries depen-
dent on Iranian imports, coupled with these kinds of broader sanctions, could have a profound effect on the Pasdaran’s 
military and economic power.
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On the eve of September 11th’s first anniversary, Damien 
Hirst, the acclaimed and highly successful golden boy of 
the art establishment’s yBa (young British artists) “high 
art lite” collective, made the following remark: “The thing 
about 9/11 is that it’s kind of an artwork in its own right. 
It was wicked, but it was devised in this way for this kind 
of impact. It was devised visually. You’ve got to hand it to 
them on some level because they’ve achieved something 
which nobody would have ever thought possible, especial-
ly to a country as big as America. So on one level they kind 
of need congratulating, which a lot of people shy away 
from, which is a very dangerous thing.”1
Though this statement was found to be in poor taste by 
the international community at the time, and was re-
tracted by the artist a few days later, it still provokes the 
question: How could Damien Hirst, an artist whose work 
is reviewed by the world’s most prominent art critics and 
whose pieces are purchased by the world’s 
wealthiest individuals, applaud such a de-
praved act, even in those careful terms? As an 
artist, how could he call it art? Who are the 
sickos here, the terrorists, Hirst... or both? And 
if Hirst is a moral degenerate, what does that 
say about all those members of society who 
applaud him?
Two answers stand out. First, is the East/West 
polarization: Al Qaeda stands for completely 
foreign, depraved, and purely evil values, 
whereas Hirst, depraved as he might appear, 
is no more than a hapless and relatively benign 
product of the bizarre art world, Western 
wealth, decadence, and over-education. The 
contrast between his sophistication and the 
ignorant, fanatical, and primitive mindset of 
the 9/11 terrorists could not be more stark.
The more cynical answer: Al Qaeda repre-
sents the vanguard of global resentment of 
American hegemony, as does Hirst; Hirst just represents a 
milder, meeker version. Instead of launching an outright 
assault on globalized, Western capitalism, Hirst manipu-
lates the market to his own ends, while at once sharing 
and mocking the snobbery of the ultra-rich. In this view, 
both Hirst and bin Laden are akin to the legendary Ameri-
can gangsters Bonnie and Clyde: two outlaws taking pot-
shots at a complacent, domineering society.
There is a third possibility. Begin by considering that Damien 
Hirst and the creators of al Qaeda are distinctly differ-
ent in their historical origins. At the same time, they are 
similarly influenced by post-colonialism, late-capitalism, 
and globalization. For modern Islamist thinkers like Sayyid 
Qutb, who directly influenced bin Laden, simultaneous 
resentment and indebtedness toward modernity fed 
nostalgia for a glorious, imaginary past. Hirst deals with 
the reality of a globalized yet fragmented world through 
Damien Hirst: “The Crow” Oil on canvas, 2009
From yBa to Al Qaeda:A Spectrum of Postmodern Spectacular
Rachel Davis
State of the Art
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visual expressions of alienation. At a glance, Damien Hirst 
may seem a world removed from Osama bin Laden, but 
their use of violent aesthetics is strikingly similar. YBa and 
al Qaeda are two sides of the same post-modern coin, a 
revelation that sheds new light on Hirst’s post-9/11 com-
ments, and possibly offers insights into terrorists’ motiva-
tions—and our own.
The terrifying nature of the choreographed 9/11 attacks 
should have been eerily familiar to any Westerner. If 
conspiracy films predominated in 1970s American culture, 
disaster films defined the 90s: Deep Impact, Armaged-
don, Independence Day, Mars Attacks, and Volcano come 
to mind. This blurred divide between the real and the 
imagined was demonstrated by President George W. Bush 
when, shortly after 9/11, he invited Spike Jonze (direc-
tor of the cult film Being John Malkovich) and Steven De 
Souza (screenwriter of the first two Die Hard movies), 
both members of the Institute for Creative Technologies, 
to a conference held jointly by the U.S. Army and the 
University of Southern California. The aim of the meet-
ing, according to art critic Terry Smith, was to “brainstorm 
about terrorist targets and schemes in America and offer 
solutions to those threats.”2 He noted, “The handcuff 
between the virtual and the real that is so typical of the 
times was confirmed by this aspect of 9.11.01: newspa-
per reports frequently cited viewers, seeing television 
images of the planes hitting the towers for the first time, 
claiming that they assumed that some kind of action 
movie was playing... . For many, perhaps all of us, 9.11.01 
remains, in varying degrees, phantasmic.”3 
Al Qaeda’s fluency with media is no accident. As Marshall 
McLuhan once wrote, “We shape our tools and thereafter 
they shape us.”4 Al Qaeda’s name for itself, translated as 
“the base, foundation, or database,”5 is modeled on the 
ultimate symbol of contemporary society, the World Wide 
Web. As a medium, the Web, even more than television, 
enables a highly visual, mass-oriented, and anti-authorita-
tive atmosphere. Coupled with an ideology that despises 
Western, and especially American, values, its inherently 
fluid, deliberately anarchic structure can be put to deadly use. 
Call September 11th telematic communication and it 
perfectly fits critic Roy Ascott’s description of telematic 
art:  “To engage in telematic communication is to be at 
Damien Hirst: “The Physical Impossibility of Death in the Mind of Someone Living” Mixed media, 1991
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once everywhere and nowhere. In this it is subversive… . 
It replaces the bricks and mortar of institutions of culture 
and learning with an invisible college and a floating mu-
seum the reach of which is always expanding to include 
the possibilities of mind and new intimations of reality.”6 
Lest we grant al Qaeda too much credit, the group was 
using the same two powerful platforms for global societal 
subversion—the computer/web and television—that the 
art world had begun to explore long before. Ideas that 
first germinated in high art had already suffused pop cul-
ture. Just think The Matrix.
Nam Jun Paik, often described as the world’s first video 
artist, wrote in 1984, “I see video not as a dictatorial me-
dium, but as a liberating one. That’s what this [video art] 
show is about, to be a symbol for how satellite television 
can cross international borders and bridge enormous cul-
tural gaps.”7 Paik’s revolutionary, anti-establishment per-
spective, in contrast to that of yBa, favored an ephemeral, 
collective voice channeled through the incantations of a 
self-effacing, as opposed to self-proclaiming, individual. 
Ironically, al Qaeda saw the same potential in the Internet 
medium that Paik did. It wielded its power in the way that 
Paik suggested, and justified its actions with similar words. 
As one observer noted:
Before satellite TV, phones and the internet, 
bin Laden might have been nothing more than 
a Messianic mahdi for a thousand tribesmen. 
But modern communications technology has 
allowed exiled radicals to broadcast their views 
to target populations free from state interference 
or retribution. Bin Laden’s gripping and powerful 
pre-recorded video clip, delivered before the US 
air raids on Afghanistan and shown by al-Jazeera 
within hours of their inception, epitomized the 
inadequacy of the response the most powerful 
state in the world could muster in the face of 
basic modern telecommunications used well.8 
Americans were subjected to watching their own icons 
warped before their eyes, in an invasion that penetrated 
not only the skies of New York City, but the privacy of the 
American living room—and the effect felt like an invasion 
of the American soul.
When President Bush called the actions the United States 
engaged in after 9/11 a “War on Terrorism,” he essentially 
launched us on a fight against a tactic. Can war be waged 
on a tactic? Is that any easier, or more worthwhile, than 
waging war on an idea? Are the two really all that differ-
ent? People have been debating the answers to these 
questions for the past ten years. We agree, meanwhile, 
that ideas are shaped by the packages they come in, 
wouldn’t it also make sense to look at the technology 
medium that has been used to promote the tactic of ter-
rorism, and the studied selection of targets that, like the 
media and subjects of art, strike at our emotions? 
This brings us back to “high art.” When astoundingly 
successful artists like Damien Hirst talk about what they 
consider “sublime,” here’s why we might want to pay more 
attention. Not only has Hirst’s own work treated death 
both digitally and in 3D, but he and other artists of his 
generation remain obsessed with spectacle and upheaval 
in Western culture. It is as if, instinctively, artists of Hirst’s 
generation have homed in on the Achilles’ heel of the 
Western world. How ironic that the subversion they want 
to embrace is wrought in the real world by real terrorists 
whose acts the artists’ adoring audiences abhor. If we can 
grasp how the work of artists like Damien Hirst gains such 
prominence in our society, we may be able to fathom how 
the al Qaeda terrorists conceived their act and so effective-
ly shattered our self-image on September 11, 2001.
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Lions of Kandahar: 
The Story of a Fight 
Against All Odds
Reviewed by LTC Jan Novak, ACR
Rusty Bradley and Kevin Maurer (2011) 
New York: Random House ISBN-10: 0553807579 
Hardcover: $26.00 USD 304 pages 
If you are looking for deep background information on the 
Afghan War, see my recommendations at the end of this 
review. If you are looking for a description of intense com-
bat viewed through the eyes of a Special Forces  
captain—carry on. 
The first rounds slammed into the windshield 
like a jackhammer. I winced, expecting the worst. 
Luckily, the bullet-resistant glass did its job; 
otherwise my brains would have been blown 
all over the truck. Rocket-propelled grenades 
(RPGs) shot by just feet away, so close I could see 
the spring-loaded stabilizer fins that can easily 
shear off men’s heads, arms, legs, and destroy a 
small vehicle with appalling quickness. We had 
just arrived at the battlefield.
Author Rusty Bradley is a former noncommissioned officer 
who, after earning his commission through Officer Candidate 
School, passed Special Forces selection and then successful-
ly negotiated the SF Qualification course. In Lions of Kanda-
har: The Story of a Fight Against All Odds, Bradley describes 
events that happened during his third tour in Afghanistan 
in 2006. He and his Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) 
331 were dismayed to find the situation in-country much 
worse than when they had left eight months earlier.
The Canadian general in command of NATO coalition 
troops in southern Afghanistan, hoping to capitalize on 
recent successes, planned a major offensive operation 
that included Bradley’s unit. The event, which had the 
name Operation Medusa, became the largest NATO-led 
offensive in Afghanistan. As happens so often in war, 
however, things did not go as planned. When enemy 
forces prevented two Canadian mechanized battle groups 
from advancing, the three American ODAs assigned a role 
in support of the leading Canadian units found themselves 
spearheading the the main effort of the operation. This 
book tells the story of how three dozen operators, as-
signed to take a single hill, gradually changed the dynam-
ics of a major battle, and in coordination with coalition air 
assets, prevented likely failure. Over a few days of intense 
combat with hundreds of enemy reported killed, coali-
tion forces retook control of the Taliban’s stronghold in 
southern Afghanistan. Bradley also makes clear, however, 
that this operation became necessary only because vague 
coalition strategy and goals over the years following the 
initial invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 allowed the Talibs 
to regain strength in areas historically and strategically 
important to them.
Among the many books about current events in Af-
ghanistan, this one stands out due to the author’s vivid 
The Written Word
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description of the battle itself. Bradley’s writing style is 
fast-paced and engaging from the opening pages all the 
way to the end, and he draws the reader quickly into both 
book and battle. Unfortunately, this intensely personal 
style, in which the world seems to revolve around the 
author, also constitutes the book’s major flaw. At the end, 
many readers finds themselves confused by the fact that 
the detailed account focuses almost entirely on Bradley’s 
experiences, while mostly omitting the contributions of 
the other ODAs, not to mention the Canadian forces. Even 
given the fact that Lions of Kandahar is Major Bradley’s 
personal memoir, he would be a more effective narrator if 
he were less narrowly focused. The other actors deserve 
more attention. The book would then have provided a 
more comprehensible and well-rounded picture of events. 
After all, the ODA is sometimes called the “A-Team,” and 
the battle was a team effort, not a one-man show. 
If you are looking for a fast-paced, gripping narrative 
about combat action down to the team and individual 
level, I recommend The Lions of Kandahar. If you want a 
book with more historical historical depth and high-quality 
background information, consider reading Steve Coll’s 
Ghost Wars (New York: Penguin Press, 2004; 720 pages); 
Gary Berntsen and Ralph Pezzullo’s Jawbreaker (New York: 
Crown Publishers, 2005; 352 pages); or Sean Naylor’s Not 
a Good Day to Die (New York: Berkley Books, 2005; 320 
pages). 
A version of this review appeared in the journal On War/
On Peace (in Czech): http://www.onwar.eu/Pakistan on 
the Brink: The Future of America, Pakistan, and Afghanistan
Reviewed by MAJ Marcus  
Forman, USA
Ahmed Rashid (2012)  
New York: Viking Press 
ISBN-10: 0670023469 
Hardcover  $26.95 USD 256 pages
For nearly 11 years, the efficacy and influence of American 
foreign policy in Pakistan has risen and fallen with the tidal 
shifts of regional politics.  Now, after more than a decade, 
the ship of American military and political expectations 
may have finally run aground on the cragged shoreline 
of reality in Pakistan. In his new book, Pakistan on the 
Brink: The Future of America, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, 
senior journalist Ahmed Rashid deftly navigates these 
waters in a way that is not only articulate and accessible, 
but even courageous thanks to his insistence on shining a 
bright light on the motives and failings of his country’s 
political and military leaders. 
Admitting that he has become decidedly more pessimistic 
in recent years, here Rashid follows his best-selling 2008 
work, Descent into Chaos: The U.S. and the Disaster in 
Pakistan, Afghanistan,  and Central Asia (New York: Pen-
guin; 560 pages) with a blend of primary source interviews 
and insightful analysis that is both credible and even-
handed. As a former guerilla from Baluchistan and now 
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an expert on the region, Rashid begins by recounting his 
coersations in 2008 with President-elect Barack Obama, 
and his concern that although Obama had great respect 
for the scope and scale of the issues in Pakistan and Af-
ghanistan, the president-elect was not well informed.  This 
deficiency, combined with Afghan President Hamid Kar-
zai’s pervasive crises of confidence and Pakistani President 
Asif Ali Zardari’s tumultuous political ascension, serves, in 
Rashid’s account, as the starting point for Pakistan’s accel-
erating slide toward the cliff’s edge of instability.
Rashid does not hesitate to recommend ways to ad-
vance and improve Pakistan’s relationships with both its 
proximate neighbors and members of the international 
community that have a vested interest in the stability of 
a nuclear-armed nation with geostrategic importance.  
The United States, he insists, must develop a strategy 
that looks far past the current 2014 horizon, when U.S. 
troops are scheduled to withdraw from Afghanistan. 
Rashid believes that, “A positive outcome for the region 
will depend on a deliberate, carefully considered Western 
withdrawal from Afghanistan, the existence of a political 
settlement with the Taliban, and Pakistan’s willingness to 
rein in Islamic extremism and prevent a potential state 
meltdown.”   
He warns, however, that any willingness to rein in domes-
tic extremism is too often subsumed by Pakistan’s histori-
cal obsession with what it perceives to be India’s drive for 
regional hegemony, a myopia that also allows Pakistan’s 
leadership to ignore the potential dangers that underrep-
resented border tribes pose for national political decision 
making. Further, Rashid cautions that the “schizophrenia” 
of Pakistan’s Afghanistan strategy, attempting to play all 
sides in the conflict against one another, may become a 
self-inflicted wound that bleeds away the credible and 
well-reasoned foreign policy the country so desperately 
needs to survive. 
From an operator’s perspective, Rashid provides the type 
of perceptive detail and insight that is critical to under-
standing the most prevalent issues for American foreign 
policy, at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.  
Pakistan on the Brink  offers more than just a primer on 
the complex and dynamic elements of the region, and will 
benefit anyone who might seek to influence them.
ATTENTION: CT Professionals
Would you like us to highlight particular activities or unique 
resources to the greater CT community? Let us know at  
CTXEditor@gmail.com and it will be considered for inclusion in 
a future issue of CTX for all our readers.Strengthening your network is our mission.
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Modern insurgents rarely fight only one enemy for the 
territory they contest. Besides the counter-insurgents—be 
they state security forces, foreign occupation troops, or 
both—the insurgents often have to battle other insur-
gents, to settle whose political vision for their post-revo-
lutionary government will prevail. These power struggles 
sometimes continue after the counter-insurgent is bested, 
and a new cycle of civil war ensues.
One of the most vicious sets of these compound civil wars 
took place in Ireland, from 1916 to 1923. The leaders of 
the Irish separatist movement, believing that the British 
home government and military would be unable to turn 
their attention from the Great War in France, mounted an 
insurrection in April of 1916, known as the Easter Rising. 
Unfortunately, the rebels overestimated the degree of 
public support they would inspire, and underestimated 
the sharpness of the British response. British intelligence 
had discovered the rebels were attempting to gain Ger-
man military aid, and Whitehall reacted forcefully. The 
Rising was crushed in a week, resulting in the deaths of 
approximately 100 British troops and 300 Irish insurgents 
and civilians, 
and the arrest 
of thousands 
of rebels and 
sympathizers.
Undeterred, 





























port in the 
south, on Jan-
uary 21, 1919, 
the leaders of 
Sinn Féin, the 
Irish Republican Army’s political wing, declared Ireland 
both independent and in a state of war with England.
The Irish War of Independence followed, characterized by 
urban and rural guerrilla warfare that pitted the insurgent 
IRA against the counter-insurgent Royal Irish Constabu-
lary. The British augmented the beleaguered RIC with 
the infamous “Black and Tans” mercenaries, so called for 
their mixed uniforms of dark green or dark blue tunics 
and khaki trousers, which an Irish journalist likened to the 
piebald hides of local fox-hunting beagles. Assassinations 
and killings by both sides brought reprisals and prop-
erty destruction—what young parliamentarian Winston 
Churchill called “murder and counter-murder.” The con-
flict stalemated, and the belligerent parties agreed to a 
truce on July 11, 1921. The subsequent Anglo-Irish Treaty 
of December/January 1922 formally ended the war, and 
set the political machinery in motion to create the Irish 
Free State. This outcome, however, was not what every-
one hoped for, and the killing continued.
The Moving ImageBefore Iraq & Afghanistan, There Was Ireland
by Kalev I. Sepp
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Claiming betrayal of their aim to free all of Ireland from 
British rule, in June 1922 the troops of the Anti-Treaty 
Irish Republican Army turned on their former comrades-
in-arms in the Irish Free State’s new National Army. The 
Republicans had already attacked Northern Ireland, 
which had opted out of independence. Paradoxically, the 
National Army joined the Anti-Treaty IRA for part of this 
northern campaign, which failed when the mounting civil 
war in the south of Ireland drew their forces away. After a 
year of bitter fighting, the National Army gained the upper 
hand. In 1923, the Anti-Treaty leader Éamon de Valera 
ordered his IRA troops to surrender, grudgingly conceding, 
“Military victory must be allowed to rest for the moment 
with those who have destroyed the Republic.”
Ultimately, the one-year-long Irish Civil War was bloodier 
than the three years of the War of Independence. The vio-
lence continued for decades between republican Catho-
lics and loyalist Protestants in Northern Ireland, which 
remained in the British Empire. Some 1,400 died in the 
war to win Irish self-rule—about 700 British troops and 
RIC police, and 700 (or more) rebels and civilians. Then, 
as many as 4,000 more Irish may have died fighting their 
fellow Irishmen. The exact number is not known. What is 
well-recalled is the viciousness of the Easter Rising, the 
Rebellion, and the Civil War, in the incongruous setting of 
one of the most beautiful countries on the planet, among 
a poetically literate and cultured people. Who else might 
claim this as the story of their nation, as well?
Four motion pictures give a sense of this complex and 
cruel series of internal conflicts, from 1916 to 1923:
Michael Collins (1996) engagingly follows one of the 
principal leaders of the Republicans (strongly played by 
Liam Neeson) from the 1916 Easter Rising to the end of 
the strife. Collins rises 
as a tough underground 
guerrilla chief to mili-
tary commander of the 
nation he helped create. 
He then must fight the 
Anti-Treaty rebels led 
by his former political 
chief, Éamon de Valera 
(Alan Rickman is excel-
lent in this role). There 
are some minor his-
torical inaccuracies, but 
these don’t detract from 
the larger story of how 
tectonic events can vault a man from gang boss learning 
to wage an insurgent war, to army commander trying to 
end an insurgent war. The film was awarded a Golden Lion 
at the Venice Film Festival.
The Informer (1935) is a gritty, street-level view of a 
tough-but-flawed “foot soldier” in the Irish Republican 
Army in 1922 (played 
convincingly by Victor 
McLaglen). The intel-
ligence section of the 
dreaded Black and Tans 
uses familiar methods 
to find and recruit an 
informer, and the rebels 
have to uncover the 
traitor in their midst. A highlight of the film is the under-
ground court-martial of the suspect. The depiction of 
guerrilla justice, administered with cold-blooded direct-
ness, is a reminder of how strictly insurgent discipline 
must be enforced for the organization to survive. John 
Ford won the first of his four Best Director Oscars for The 
Informer, and the film won three more for Best Actor 
(McLaglen), Screenplay, and Music. Incidentally, at the 
1935 Venice Film Festival, Ford was also nominated for 
the Mussolini Cup. He likely didn’t miss having that trophy 
on his bookshelf. (There is a less-noted 1929 British-made 
motion picture, based on the same novel.)
The Wind That Shakes the Barley (2006) is on the one 
hand an attractive motion picture—shot on location in 
verdant County Cork, and with a lyrical title from a 19th 
century Irish ballad—but on the other hand it has the 
tinny drumbeat of political propaganda. The storyline runs 
from 1919 to 1923, and tells a metaphorical tale of two 
brothers who fight side-
by-side during the War 
of Independence, then 
against each other in the 
Civil War. Despite this 
appealing plot, the more 
positive reviews called 




critics wrote that Loach 
unevenly portrayed “the 
British as sadists and the 
Irish as romantic, ideal-
istic resistance fighters” 
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(this from an Irish historian), and that the film was “a 
poisonously anti-British corruption of the history of the 
war” (so wrote a Scottish journalist). These deficiencies 
and others, including stagey political dialogues and tire-
some readings of manifestos, make this movie unhelpful 
to students of these wars, either as documentary his-
tory, or as an insight into the successive conflicts. That 
said, it won the Palm d’Or at the Cannes Film Festival, as 
well as several Irish film awards, and did well at the box 
office in Ireland. At the least, it represents fine pro-IRA 
propaganda.
Shake Hands with the Devil (1959) is a well-done piece 
of historical fiction, which begins in 1921 Dublin, where 
the movie was filmed. At 
Trinity College, a promi-
nent doctor (James 
Cagney at his profes-
sional best) is a medical 
school professor by day, 
and an insurgent unit 
commandant by night. 
The contradictory dilem-
mas of guerrilla warfare 
are presented one after 
another, from smug-
gling to hostage-taking 
to summary executions. 
When the news of the 
truce ending the War of 
Independence arrives, 
the commandant finds 
his unit divided between 
those relieved to see 
the fighting end, and the 
Anti-Treaty rebels who 
want to fight on. Actor 
Richard Harris has his 
first significant role in 
this movie, as a loose-
lipped IRA gunman, 
short on smarts but long 
on mad courage. (Do not 
confuse this movie with the 2007 film of the same name, 
about the Rwandan genocide.)
Bonus	Movie
Set in 1940s Belfast, where much of this film was shot, the 
acclaimed noir film Odd Man Out (1947) artfully depicts 
people unexpectedly entangled in political violence in 
northern Ireland. Al-
though the Irish Civil War 
finished the fighting in 
the south, “The Troubles” 
continued in the nine 
Unionist counties of Ul-
ster province that chose 
to remain under British 
dominion. Strapped for 
cash for operations, the 
leader of an IRA-like gang 
(James Mason) decides to 
rob a mill, and then must 
evade police “in a bleak 
labyrinth of havens and 
traps.” In England, Odd 
Man Out was awarded “Best British Film,” and was nomi-
nated for both a Golden Lion at the Venice Film Festival, 
and a Best Film Editing Oscar. 
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I recently received an email from a student in which 
he made the following observation: of the ten highest 
military service awards America bestows, the qualifying 
criteria for each involves either physical courage and brav-
ery, or extended periods of service with extreme responsi-
bility. Not one, my student observed, is for demonstrating 
moral courage.
Around this same time, I presented a case study to my 
class that involved a moderate to serious military indiscre-
tion. A number of my students that day concluded that 
the best resolution to the dilemma was to keep the matter 
“in house” (i.e. within the organization), and not to go 
public with the indiscretion. They cited as reasons the po-
tential damage to the reputation of the military in general, 
and to the specific branch in particular. When I raised the 
idea of a possible moral obligation to come forward pub-
licly with the truth regardless of the embarrassment, one 
student remarked, “Sir, we are not a service of rats!” —in 
other words, not a service of squealers, stool pigeons, or 
leakers of secrets.
Taken together, the 
two instances make 
me wonder:  
If moral courage 
isn’t recognized 
and highly re-
warded, is there 
any real incentive 
to exercise it within 
the American 
military or any 
other military, in 
government agencies, or in any national or international 
civic organization entrusted with public care, welfare, and 
protection? If rather than being admired, people who act 
with moral courage are often regarded as “rats” because 
they upset organizational complacency, does that raise a 
palpable disincentive to do the right thing?
The ethicist Rushworth Kidder, in his book Moral Courage 
(New York: William Morrow and Co., 2005) defines any act 
of moral courage as consisting of three elements: a moral 
principle, a danger involved in acting upon the principle, 
and a willingness, despite clear recognition of the dan-
ger, to act upon that principle nonetheless. For Kidder, if 
there is no moral principle at stake, it’s not an act of moral 
courage. 
The dangers of acting upon that principle can run the 
gamut from social ostracism or loss of employment to 
blacklisting, or even threats to one’s health and safety. 
If one fully understands both the moral principle in play 
and the dangers 
involved, and if 
one chooses to act 
upon that principle 
anyway—recogniz-
ing that the dangers 
may well come to 
pass—Kidder regards 
that choice as an act 
of moral courage.  
Such an actor would 
hardly seem worthy 
of the label “rat.”
Yet if, regardless of rank or position, people are not 
taught, trained, and rewarded for acting with moral cour-
age, can society really expect them to demonstrate it any-
way, particularly when the disincentives may be so strong? 
Can we call people to task for a failure to act with moral 
courage in the face of organizational and social norms that 
discourage or even condemn such behavior? Or to put it 
another way, if we want people to act with moral courage, 
do we first have an ethical obligation to teach and reward 




An act of moral courage... 
consists of three elements:  
a moral principle, a danger 
involved in acting upon the 
principle, and a willingness, 
despite clear recognition 
of the danger, to act upon 
that principle nonetheless. 
Can we call people to task 
for a failure to act with 
moral courage in the face 
of organizational and 
social norms that discour-
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Oman: The Present in the Context of a Fractured Past
by Roby C. Barrett 
Issue Date: August 2011 (JSOU Report 11-5)
Dr. Roby Barrett’s study of some 200 years of the Sultanate of Oman’s dynastic history 
puts into context the last four decades of the Sultanate’s history. It answers the ques-
tion of whether Oman has changed fundamentally from a nation fraught with instabil-
ity and conflict to one of peace and stability. Barrett’s analysis of modern-day Oman 
will help the reader avoid misinterpreting the country’s present condition on the basis 
of Oman’s largely tumultuous past, which often featured conflict and competition for 
wealth and power. Dr. Barrett’s two most recent monographs, this work on Oman and 
his earlier study “Yemen: A Different Political Paradigm in Context”, are bookends that will provide the SOF reader with a 
deep understanding of the historical context which has resulted in the southern Arabian region of today.
Resources: Publication Announcements
Cultural and Linguistic Skills Acquisition for Special Forces
by Russell D. Howard  
Issue Date: December 2011 (JSOU Report 11-6)
 Brigadier General (Ret) Russ Howard articulates the need for SOF to develop language 
and cultural skills capabilities that reflect the wider range of locales and ethnic groups 
in which SOF engage while carrying out their diverse missions.  General Howard out-
lines various definitions of culture and highlights the relationship between cultural un-
derstanding and the ability to predict behavior on the ground--an invaluable asset for a 
SOF operator.  Drawing on his experience leading the Special Forces Language School, 
General Howard explores the relationship between learning a language and culture, 
highlighting the implications for SOF.  As USSOCOM and SOF rebalance the force for long-term deployments in complex 
operating environments, this monograph is an important contribution to the discussion of how language and cultural 
skills capabilities should be defined, prioritized, and developed. 
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by Thomas Henriksen 
Issue Date: February 2012 (JSOU Report 12-1)
Dr. Henriksen argues that America needs to get back to the basics of counterinsurgency 
lest it bankrupts itself in nation-building and reconstruction projects that are driven 
from the top, not the bottom. Citing tremendously expensive “Winning Hearts and 
Minds” efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, he hypothesizes that “WHAM operations must 
be waged with much less expenditure of U.S. dollars in the years ahead.”  He offers Britain’s frugal victory in Malaya as 
one example of a low budget counterinsurgency success that started with protecting the people, over time formed a rep-
resentative government, and linked the people and their support to that government.  Economic development was part 
of the strategy, but it was a supporting and complementary effort.  It wasn’t a major effort in and of itself.“We Will Find a Way”: 
Understanding the Legacy of Canadian Special Operations Forces 
by Bernd Horn 
Issue Date: February 2012 (JSOU Report 12-2)
Colonel Bernd Horn’s monograph on the legacy of Canadian Special Operations Forces 
(SOF) highlights the colorful history and heritage of SOF in a vital partner nation. Horn 
reaches back to the 17th and 18th centuries with the Canadian Ranger tradition. He recounts Canada’s entry into World 
War II and its SOF experience with the British-led Special Operations Executive. He highlights the First Special Service 
Force, in which Candians and Americans trained together in Montana and fought alongside each other, earning the 
moniker “Black Devils” from the Germans. Colonel Horn then brings readers to the present day. This is a brief but excit-
ing recap of Canadian SOF history that not only enriches our understanding of a key ally, but also highlights the historic 
bonds and military experiences that our two great nations share.
37
Vol. 2, No. 2 May 2012 | CTX
If terrorists were to strike another 
major city, what would the United 
States do? Aside from the dedicated 
first responders, Americans would cast 
about for whom to blame. In such a 
vitriolic atmosphere, what would our 
national response be? Who would be 
the target? Given our current na-
tional strategy, what type of American 
response should the rest of the world 
expect?
The United States has never articulat-
ed a clearly stated position on national 
defense: respect our sovereignty and 
we will respect yours. In The Sover-
eignty Solution—a radical yet com-
monsensical approach to recalibrating 
global security—an anthropologist and 
her Special Forces coauthors discuss 
what the United States could actually 
do to restore order to the world without having to engage 
in either global policing or nation building. 
Anna Simons has a PhD in anthropology from Harvard 
University and is a Professor of Defense Analysis at the 
Naval Postgraduate School. LTC Joe McGraw and ltC 
Duane Lauchengco are both graduates of the United 
States Military Academy as well as NPS, and are U.S. Army 
Special Forces officers serving with two different Special 
Forces groups.
“Counterinsurgency by nation building is concurrently 
official U.S. doctrine, an evident case of military malprac-
tice, and the imperialism of fools… This book is a valuable 
contribution because it describes a 
perfectly sound alternative to the cur-
rent U.S. military conduct.”—EdWard 
N. LUTTWAK, military strategist and 
historian; author of Strategy: The 
Logic of War and Peace
“Like an unexpected wet mop in the 
face of tired complacency, The Sover-
eignty Solution works on the receptive 
mind as a pry bar works on a tightly 
sealed box. Written with courage 
and passion, this is a book whose 
often counterintuitive clarity shakes 
entombed assumptions like an earth-
quake. Whether you end up convinced 
or not, you will never think about 
American national security the same 
way ever again.”—Adam Garfinkle, 
editor of The American Interest
“While one can disagree with them, 
the authors make a strong case for a U.S. strategy that 
leaves other countries alone to live as they wish unless 
they attack our sovereignty. The beauty of the strategy is 
its stark simplicity. As important, the three authors work 
daily with U.S. military officers, and they cannot mask 
their frustration and anguish over national leadership that 
sends young Americans into combat without even having 
the guts to seek formal declarations of war, and without 
operationally clear criteria for success. The authors care, 
and so should we all.”—The Honorable James G. Roche, 
20th Secretary of the U.S. Air Force
The Sovereignty Solution:  
A Commonsense Approach  
to Global Security
by Anna Simons, LTC Joe McGraw, and LTC Duane Lauchengco 
Naval Institute Press ISBN/SKU:  9781612510507 
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The Combating Terrorism Exchange journal (CTX) accepts submissions of nearly any type. Our aim is to distribute high 
quality international analyses, opinions, and reports to military officers, government officials, and security and academic 
professionals in the world of counterterrorism. We give priority to non-typical, insightful submissions, and to topics con-
cerning countries with the most pressing terrorism and CT issues. We accept submissions from anyone.
Terms of Copyright
Copyright © 2012.  The copyright of all articles 
published in CTX rests with the author(s) of the 
article, unless otherwise noted. The Combating 
Terrorism Exchange journal (“CTX”) is a peer- 
reviewed, quarterly issued journal available 
free of charge to individuals and institutions. 
Copies of this journal and the articles con-
tained herein may be printed or downloaded 
and redistributed for personal, research or 
educational purposes free of charge and with-
out permission, except if otherwise noted. Any 
commercial use of CTX or the articles published 
herein is expressly prohibited without the writ-
ten consent of the copyright holder.  
Submission	Guidelines
CTX accepts the following types of submissions, and offers 
the following length guidelines:
• academic analyses (5,000–7,000 words)
• reports or insightful stories from the field (2,000 
words)
• photographic essays
• video clips with explanation or narration
• interviews with relevant figures (no longer than 15 
minutes)
• book reviews (500–1,000 words); review essays 
(1,000–3,000 words); or lists of books of interest 
(which may include books in other languages)
• reports on any special projects
Submission	Requirements
Submissions to CTX must adhere to the following:
• they must be copyedited for basic errors prior to 
submission;
• citations should adhere to the Chicago Manual of 
Style;
• the work submitted may not be plagiarized in part or 
in whole;
• you must have received consent from anyone whose 
pictures, videos, or statements you include in your 
work;
• you must agree to our Terms of Copyright;
• include a byline as you would like it to appear and a 
short bio as you would like it to appear (we may use 
either, or both);
• Any kind of submission can be multimedia.
Submissions should be sent in original, workable format (in other 
words, we must be able to edit your work in the format in which you 
send it to us: no PDFs please!)
Submissions should be in English. Because we seek submissions from 
the global CT community, and especially look forward to work which 
will stir debate, WE WILL NOT REJECT submissions outright simply 
because of poorly written English. However, we may ask you to have 
your submission re-edited before submitting again.
Ready	to	Submit?
By making a submission to CTX you are acknowledging that your sub-
mission adheres to all of the Submission Requirements listed above, 
and that you agree to the CTX Terms of Copyright, so read them 
carefully.
Once you have met the above requirements and agree to the Terms 
of Copyright, you may send your submission directly to:  
CTXSubmit@gmail.com
If you have questions about submissions, or anything else, please 
contact: CTXEditor@gmail.com

